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STATUTORY OR CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES 
Article I Section 12, Utah State Constitution. 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right.. . to be 
confronted by the witnesses against h im, . . . 
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary 
examination, the function of that examination is limited to 
determining whether probable cause exists unless otherwise provided 
by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall preclude the use of 
reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute or rile in whole or in 
part at any preliminary examination to determine probable cause or at 
any pretrial proceeding with respect to release of the defendant if 
appropriate discovery is allowed as defined by statute or rule. 
Possession is defined by UCA 58-37-1 as: 
"Possession" or "use" means the joint or individual ownership, control, 
occupancy, holding, retaining, belonging, maintaining, or the application, 
inhalation, swallowing, injection, or consumption . . . . For a person to be a 
possessor or user of a controlled substance, it is not required that he be shown 
to have individually possessed, used, or controlled the substance, but it is 
sufficient if it is shown that the person jointly participated with one or more 
persons in the use, possession, or control of any substances with knowledge 
that the activity was occurring, or the controlled substance is found in a place 
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or under circumstances indicating that the person had the ability and the 
intent to exercise dominion and control over it. (Emphasis Added.) 
The information charges a violation UCA 58-37-8f2)(a¥i) and provides the 
following: 
. . . that the defendant did knowingly and intentionally 
unlawfully possess a controlled substance . . . 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The trial court dismissed the 'possession' charges at the preliminary hearing 
stage (counts 1-4). The trial court found particularly that no evidence was 
introduced to make a finding of possession as required. The State presents this 
appeal seeking to overturn and reverse the Court's ruling. The question presented is 
whether the trial court's findings should be reversed. 
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STATEMENT OF CASE 
This is an appeal by the State of Utah from an order dismissing the Counts 1-4 
of the information at the preliminary hearing level. The State had charged the 
defendant with possession methamphetamine and possession of paraphernalia on 
August 8, 2002. The methamphetamine is residue located on the paraphernalia. No 
quantity of the substance was located excepting the noted residue. 
This resulted from a search of a home where the defendant once occupied. 
They arrested him on August 20, 2002 and required him to submit to a 
urinalysis wherein the tested positive (field test only) for morphine (loratab) and 
methamphetamine. 
Count 5 of the information has been dismissed by the State. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
The Court's findings reflect the facts. The findings are essentially set out 
below with reference to the transcript. They are as follows: 
(i) The defendant was on probation and was being supervised by Adult 
Probation and Parole, 
(ii) There was a single family residence located in Sanpete County, Utah and 
more particularly in Mt. Pleasant, Utah. (T. 39 L. 8-25) 
(hi) The Court issued a search warrant authorizing a search of the residence, 
(iv) Police officers from the Sanpete County Drug Task force went to the 
residence to execute the search warrant. 
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(v) Upon entering the residence, the defendant was not located in the home 
but certain items were located in a bedroom including the defendant's social 
security card, a day planner bearing the name of the defendant and finally 
male clothing and other items associated with men. 
(vi) Drug paraphernalia was located in the home. No drugs were located 
except for residue being upon the paraphernalia. (T. 39 L. 12-28) 
(vii) The officer learned from the ex-wife that the defendant had been living 
there and had spent the previous night at the home. (T. 39) 
(viii) The ex-wife had been staying at the home for 5-7 days preceding. Her son 
was also there as well as one of his friends, 
(ix) The defendant was arrested on August 20, 2002. He was required to 
provide a urine sample. The sample was later tested via field testing and 
tested positive for the presence of morphine (Loratab) and methamphetamine. 
Count 1 & 2 
The defendant was charged with possession of methamphetamine ( the 
residue on the paraphernalia) and drug paraphernalia resulting from the events of 
August, 8, 2002. 
Count 3 & 4 
From the urine specimens taken on August 20, 2002, the defendant was 
charged with possession of morphine (Loratab) and methamphetamine although 
such substances were only located in his urine. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The State has the burden of proof, although minimal, at the preliminary 
hearing stage. However, the trial court is not rubber stamp. The trial court has a 
responsibility to ferret out groundless and improvident prosecutions. 
The essence of the charge of'possession of a controlled substance' requires 
some causal connection between the defendant and the drug. Here, two adults were 
present in the home searched and three occupied the home excluding the defendant. 
The State did not present a sufficient nexus between the drug and the defendant to 
legitimately infer that he possessed the same. 
Further, the supposed drugs located on August 8, 2002 consisted of residue 
upon the paraphernalia. The charge of paraphernalia, if a nexus is to be shown, is 
the only justifiable charge herein. Counts 1 & 2. 
The charges contained with Count 3 & 4 are based on a urine sample taken 
from the defendant on August 20, 2002. No drugs were found to be the basis of a 
possession charge. The only indication of any drugs was located in the urine sample 
provided by the defendant. This constitute only a residual amount of a drug. It is not 
the drug and is not capable of possession or use. It however may constitutes an 
indication of past use. 
ARGUMENT 
The preliminary hearing allows the magistrate to fulfill the primary purpose 
of the preliminary hearing of ferreting out groundless and improvident prosecutions. 
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Anderson. 612 P.2d at 783-84; State v. Clark. 2001 Ut 9, 20 P.3d 300. If the State did 
not establish a prima facie case against the defendant by producing "believable and 
credible evidence of all the elements of the crime charged."1 State v. Emmett 839 
P.2d 781, 784 (Utah 1992). 
To bind a defendant over for trial, statutorily the State must show probable 
cause to establish that the crime charged has been committed and that the defendant 
has committed it. State v. Pledger. 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 (Utah 1995); Evans v. State. 
963 P.2d 177, 182 (Utah 1998). Although the burden is low for the State, thev must 
produce enough evidence sufficient to survive a motion for directed verdict with 
respect to each element of the crime." State v. Talbot. 972 P.2d 435, 438 (Utah 1998). 
In State v. Robinson. 2003 UT App 1, 63 P.3d 105(2003), this Court 
reviewed the refusal to bind over the charge of manslaughter. The State there 
appealed seeking a reversal of the trial court's dismissal the charge at the preliminary 
hearing. The Court stated the current status of the law respecting preliminary 
hearings: 
The "quantum of evidence necessary to support a bindover" is that amount 
necessary "to support a reasonable belief that an offense has been committed 
and that the defendant committed it." 
"Yet, '[t]he magistrate's role in this process... is not that of a rubber 
stamp for the prosecution.1" l± (quoting State v. Hester. 2000 UT App 159, 
3 P.3d 725. cert, denied. 9P.3dl70 (Utah 2000)). The magistrate is still 
expected to "fulfill the primary purpose of the preliminary hearing, [which 
is to] "ferretfl out . . . groundless and improvident prosecutions.'" 
(Emphasis Added) 
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Justice Davis in his concurring opinion in Robinson questioned propriety of 
relying on the so-called presumption that the prosecution's case will only get stronger 
as the investigation continues. He finds that this presumption has no legal or factual 
basis and should not be relied upon. His concurring opinion reports: 
Several Utah cases rely in whole or in part on the 
presumption that the fn prosecution's case will only get stronger as the 
investigation continues.1" State v. Clark. 2001 UT 9. U 10, 20 P.3d 300 
(quoting Evans, 963 P.2d at 182 (other citation omitted)). Utah case law 
has incorporated this presumption from a line of Oklahoma cases that 
presume "'the State will strengthen its evidence at trial.1" State v. 
Pledger. 896 P.2d 1226. 1229 (Utah 1995) (quoting Diaz v.State. 728 
P.2d 503. 510 (Okla. Cr. 1986)). ... 
Now, the presumption is embedded in Utah jurisprudence. 
However, it has no factual or legal basis to support it. The presumption 
that "the prosecution is entitled to hold the defendant on a lesser 
standard while it hunts for additional evidence . . . may have been 
supportable in the middle of the last century when the police were not 
as sophisticated as they are today and when it may have been easier to 
flee to avoid prosecution." Kenneth Graham & Leon Letwin, The 
Preliminary Hearings in Los Angeles: Some Field Findings and Legal-
Policy Observations. 18 UCLA L. Rev. 635, 692 (1971). However, 
today, "unless the statute of limitations is about to run, it is difficult to 
defend binding over the defendant while the police search for evidence 
that will support a conviction." IcL In fact, "[a]s a practical matter, in 
most cases police investigation ceases once the complaint has been 
issued." 
Application to Case. 
This case is ripe for dismissal at the trial level. Here, no direct evidence 
existed to conclude the defendant possessed the substance. The State must rely on 
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inferences drawn from circumstantial evidence to suggest 'possession'. These 
inferences are based on the hearsay statements of the defendant's ex-wife. 
The defendant was not present at the home searched and had not been for 
living there for some time. The only evidence suggesting any nexus of the drugs to 
the defendant was hearsay testimony of an ex-wife. She suggested that the defendant 
had been there the night before. But she indicated that she, her 18 year old son and 
another friend had been at the home and more particularly she had been staying there 
for the last 5-7 days. Paraphernalia was located in the room that she indicated that 
the defendant had used before. Drugs were not found excepting the paraphernalia 
had residue upon it. 
EX-WIFE'S STATEMENTS 
The State relies on hearsay statements from the ex-wife incriminating the 
defendant. Utah law does not allow unreliable hearsay at the preliminary hearing. If 
the hearsay is to be used, Utah Constitution,Article I Section 12, mandates that such 
hearsay be reliable. 
It provides: 
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary 
examination, the function of that examination is limited to 
determining whether probable cause exists unless otherwise provided 
by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall preclude the use of 
reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute or rule in whole or in 
part at any preliminary examination to determine probable cause or at 
any pretrial proceeding.... 
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The trial court had authority to decide if such statements were reliable. The ex-
wfie did not testify. Her statements were provided via the police officer reporting her 
supposed statements. It is not questioned that this is hearsay. Consequently, the next 
question is whether this is reliable. 
The trial court has obligation to determine if such statements are, in fact, 
reliable. Here, the court declined to use such statements in its analysis. First, she is 
an ex-wife. Secondly, she has more motivation than any to incriminate her ex-
husband to avoid criminal consequences herself. 
In State v. Webster, 32 P.3d 976, this Court addressed the issue of whether a 
supportive wife's hearsay statements could be introduced which incriminated her 
husband. This Court found such statements, in that particular case, to be 
inadmissible. The Court cited favorably the following guidelines to determine 
trustworthiness. 
In determining whether a statement is sufficiently 
reliable for purposes of Rule 803(24), a court should 
examine, among other factors: (1) the probable 
motivation of the declarant in making the statement; 
(2) the circumstances under which it was made; and (3) 
the knowledge and qualifications of the declarant. 
Similarly, in construing Rule 804(b)(5), we have 
identified several additional factors that may be 
considered in determining whether hearsay testimony 
has sufficient "guarantees of trustworthiness.". . .: 
(1) the character of the declarant for truthfulness 
and honesty and the availability of evidence on the 
issue; (2) whether the [statement] was given 
voluntarily, under oath, subject to cross examination 
and a penalty for perjury; (3) the extent to which the 
[declarant's statement] reflects his personal 
knowledge; (4) whether the [declarant] ever recanted 
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his [statement]; and (5) whether the declarant's 
statement was insufficiently corroborated. 
Here the trial court properly declined to utilize such statements. The ex-wife's 
potential bias is obvious. 
The trial court is not obliged to make every finding, even if contrary to law, in 
favor of the State. The court has an obligation to fulfill its constitutional duties to 
make judicious decisions based on the applicable law and not merely act as a rubber 
stamp for the prosecution. 
ELEMENTS TO ESTABLISH POSSESSION 
Possession requires more proof than just being at the home at sometime in the 
past. These issues have been addressed repeatedly by the Appellate Courts. 
Possession is defined by UCA 58-37-1 as: 
"Possession" or "use" means the joint or individual ownership, control, 
occupancy, holding, retaining, belonging, maintaining, or the application, 
inhalation, swallowing, injection, or consumption . . . For a person to be a 
possessor or user of a controlled substance, it is not required that he be shown 
to have individually possessed, used, or controlled the substance, but it is 
sufficient if it is shown that the person jointly participated with one or more 
persons in the use, possession, or control of any substances with knowledge 
that the activity was occurring, or the controlled substance is found in a place 
or under circumstances indicating that the person had the ability and the 
intent to exercise dominion and control over it. (Emphasis Added.) 
Statutorily, UCA 58-37-8(2¥a)(D, Utah law requires that he had the ability and 
the intent to exercise dominion and control over it. 
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The Utah Courts have uniformly found that possession requires nexus 
between the accused and the drug and this proof must be sufficient enough to allow 
an inference that the accused had both the ability and the intent to exercise dominion 
and control over the drug." State v. Salas. 820 P.2d 1386. 1388 (Utah Ct.App. 1991 
In State v. Anderton, 668 P.2d 1257 (Utah 1983), the Utah Supreme Court 
noted: 
Some of the key factual determinations, which have 
supported findings of constructive possession in 
other cases are: 1) defendant's presence at the 
time the drugs were found, with emphasis on the 
fact that the drugs were in plain or open view; 2) 
the defendant's access to the drugs; 3) the 
proximity of defendant to the drugs; 4) evidence 
indicating that the "defendant was participating 
with others in the mutual use and enjoyment of the 
contraband"; and 5) incriminating statements. 
Id. at 1264 (citations omitted). 
In State v. Sorensen, 758 P.2d 466, the Utah Court of Appeals reversed a 
conviction for 'possession of alcohol* and cited favorably State v. Hornadav, 713 
P.2d 71 (Wash. 1986). There the Homadav Court found that the term 'possession' 
required that the defendant: 
(i) knew of the substance's presence; 
(ii) is immediately accessible; and 
iii) the defendant exercises dominion and control over the substance. 
The essential element of control and accessibility is clearly absent here. 
The State seeks to rely on prior occupation. However, the Utah Courts 
unanimously find that mere ownership or occupation of the home is not enough. 
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State v. Salas, 820 P.2d at 1388; State v. Fox. 709 P.2d at 319. State v. Anderton,j668 
P.2d 1258, 1263-64 (Utah 1983). See also Emile F. Short, Annotation, Conviction of 
Possession of Illicit Drugs Found in Automobile of Which Defendant Was Not Sole 
Occupant, 57 A.L.R.3d 1319, 1323 (1974). 
In Salas, the defendant was stopped while driving a vehicle with two 
passengers. A search revealed drugs "in the crack of the backseat on the driver's side, 
where the bottom of the cushion fits the back." The court found the evidence 
insufficient to support a conviction of the driver for possession of a controlled 
substance based on constructive possession: 
Although defendant owned and occupied the vehicle, 
the ownership and occupancy were not exclusive. 
Defendant's wife was a co-owner . . . and there 
were two passengers in the vehicle at the time of 
arrest. One passenger had better access to the 
spot where cocaine was found than did defendant. 
Further, defendant denied the presence of cocaine 
before the search, did not try to escape the scene 
during the search, denied putting the cocaine in 
the vehicle after it was discovered, and did not 
have drugs or drug paraphernalia on his person at 
the time of arrest. The drug itself was found in 
an area that was not easily accessible to the 
defendant. There had been a backseat passenger 
close to where the drug was found, and this 
passenger was seen moving around in a furtive 
manner just before the traffic stop. . . . Neither 
[officer] testified that defendant carried a 
package to his vehicle, talked suspiciously with 
the other passengers, was in the back seat or 
reached to the back seat, or that defendant's 
behavior was suspicious in any way. 
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In State v. Lavman. 953 P.2d 782. 792 (Utah Ct. App. 1998); reviewed on 
certiorari by the Supreme Court at State v. Lavman. (1999 Utah) 985 P.2d 911; 
the defendant son used his car to drive Hobart, his father, and Gina, mother of his 
children to Vernal. While Hobart slept on the trip, Layman and Gina talked about 
their experiences involving their respective children and the state. No evidence was 
presented to indicate they discussed drugs during the drive. 
Upon arriving in Vernal, the three stopped at a motel. After some twenty 
minutes there, they left the motel and Layman and Gina dropped Hobart off at 
another location. Before leaving, Hobart handed Gina a pouch, which she believed 
contained items that belonged to her and Hobart. Hobart then said he would call 
Layman at Layman's sister's house when it was time to pick him up. 
Almost immediately upon dropping Hobart off, Layman was stopped by 
Deputy Abplanalp for a faulty taillight. Layman's auto jerked to the right and then to 
the left before stopping perpendicular to the police car. Layman then briskly 
approached 
Abplanalp to ask why he was stopped, and, appearing upset, tried to fix the faulty 
light. Layman appeared fidgety and anxious, and his eyes were red, bloodshot, and 
watery. 
Layman denied he had either drugs or alcohol in his vehicle, and consented to a 
search of himself and his car. During Abplanalp's attempt to obtain the pouch from 
Gina, however, 
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Gina continuously looked toward Layman, who at one point appeared to shake his 
head in a negative fashion. Field sobriety tests and a drug recognition evaluation 
indicated Layman was under the influence of drugs; this indication was later 
confirmed by a blood test. Both deputies who questioned Layman noticed needle 
marks on his arms. 
Based on these facts, the Layman Court concluded: 
Although this evidence more than adequately supports a 
conclusion that Layman was under the influence of drugs, it 
does not support, beyond a reasonable doubt, a finding that 
Layman had the knowledge, ability, and intent to exercise 
dominion and control over the contraband found on Ginafs 
person. 
The State produced no evidence, direct or circumstantial, 
supporting its claims — beyond a reasonable doubt, as it must 
— that Layman knew about Hobart's drug transactions or the 
contents of Gina's pouch, or, more importantly, that Layman had 
or could have exercised any dominion and control over the 
contraband in the pouch, or that he intended to exercise such 
control. There is not a sufficient quality or quantity of 
evidence — direct or otherwise — indicating or from which a 
fact finder could infer that Layman was present at any time 
during which Hobart and Gina discussed their drug transaction, 
that he was aware he was driving his father to Vernal to complete that 
transaction, that he was present in the motel room or within hearing range 
while Hobart weighed and discussed the drugs with Gina or that he was 
aware of the contents of the pouch that Hobart had given Gina. 
Given this pivotal deficiency in the State's case, the 
circumstantial evidence presented does not sufficiently exclude 
reasonable alternative hypotheses of Layman's innocence. The 
State points to Layman's contributing his car and time in 
driving Hobart and Gina to Vernal. However, the State does not 
exclude the possibility that Layman may have just been doing 
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his father a favor by driving to Vernal, or that Layman may 
have agreed to drive because he wanted to see his sister, who 
apparently lives in Vernal and to whose house Layman was 
heading at the time of his traffic stop. See Arellanes v. 
United States, 302 F.2d 603, 606-07 (9th Cir. 1962) (stating 
evidence that wife was present with husband at time drugs were 
found in car and that she was probably aware of presence of 
drugs was not sufficient to establish elements of joint venture 
where her presence with husband and drugs "is as fully 
explained by her attachment to her husband as it might be by a 
control over the drugs."); State v. Shipp, 216 N.J. Super. 662, 
524 A.2d 864, 866 (App. Div. 1987) (stating "members of the same family 
commonly travel together in the same automobile, and the fact that these 
two were together on this occasion is no more consistent with the 
proposition that defendant was a 
participant in [his grandmother's] criminal enterprise than 
that he was not."). 
The Supreme Court, at 985 P.2d 911. reviewed the decision of the Court of 
Appeals and found: 
The present case is not a house or car case. Here, the question is 
whether Michael had sufficient control over another person to prove 
constructive possession of something that person had in her physical 
possession. We refer to the general test that those factors were used to 
implement in the specific Fox and Salas situations, to wit, whether there 
was evidence of a sufficient nexus between the defendant and the drugs or 
paraphernalia to permit a factual inference that the defendant had the 
power and the intent to exercise control over those drugs or paraphernalia. 
Stated differently, to show constructive possession, the State must prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the drugs were subject to the defendant's 
dominion and control and the defendant had the intent to exercise that 
control. See idL We conclude that the court of appeals properly found the 
evidence in this case is insufficient. When all the brush is cleared, the 
critical fact is that there was little evidence to prove that Michael had such 
control over Gina's person that one could reasonably infer beyond a 
reasonable doubt that he knowingly and intentionally possessed the drugs 
and paraphernalia in her pouch. The only fact tending to prove Michael's 
control over Gina is that she looked at him when the deputy requested to 
17 
see the pouch and that Michael shook his head in a negative fashion. This 
simply is not enough. All the other evidence in this case does nothing to 
address this critical factual issue. Neither her presence in his vehicle, his 
erratic behavior after the traffic stop, nor his use of drugs at some 
Defendant suggests the Court follow the logic of Spanish Fork City v. 
Bryan, 975 P.2d 50 (Utah App. 1999). Defendant Bryan appealed her conviction for 
possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-37a-5 (1996). The Court reversed the conviction. Officer's searched her 
home when she was not present. The search produced a roach clip, scissors, clippers, 
zig-zags and "antique" prescription pill bottles dated from 1968 to 1978. Also found 
were hypodermic needles, hemostats, and a photograph of six men, including 
defendant's husband, in which two of the men were smoking a bong. The 
hypodermic needles were found beneath the mattress of the bed defendant shared 
with her husband. All other items were openly displayed and in plain view of the 
investigating officers. The Court found that for the State to prevail, they must (1) 
show that defendant was in possession of the items seized from the residence she 
shared with her husband and (2) prove that defendant intended to use the items 
seized as drug paraphernalia. 
Defendant was not at the residence during the search, the Court concluded 
that the evidence was insufficient to prove "constructive possession." 
Factors to be considered were: 
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(iii) Defendant's presence at the time the drugs were found, with 
emphasis on the fact that the drugs were in plain or open view; 
(Defendant is absent here) 
(iv) The defendant's access to the drugs (none here); 
(v) The proximity of defendant to the drugs (none here); 
(vi) Evidence indicating that the 'defendant was participating with 
others in the mutual use and enjoyment of the contraband' (none 
here); and 
(vii) Incriminating statements (none). 
Defendant was not present at the time the items were found. Second, 
although defendant may have had access to the items found in her home, there was 
no evidence that she used or intended to use the items for illegal purposes. Third, 
there was no evidence that defendant participated in the mutual use of the items 
seized. Lastly, defendant made no statements, incriminating or otherwise. The Court 
held as follows: 
Because inferences constitute virtually the entire case against defendant, the 
factual evidence in this case is inconclusive as to whether she possessed the 
items found in her home. Even accepting that the items seized are 
commonly used in the "drug world" for various purposes and that some of 
the items may indeed be paraphernalia, defendant's conviction for 
possession of paraphernalia "is based solely on inferences that give rise to 
only remote or speculative possibilities of guilt." Workman, 852 P.2d at 985. 
"There must be some additional nexus between the accused and the [items 
seized] to show that the accused had the power and intent to exercise 
dominion and control over [them]." Hansen, 732 P.2d at 132. Because the 
nexus between defendant and the items is lacking, there is simply "not a 
sufficient quality or quantity of evidence" to support a determination that 
defendant was in possession of drug paraphernalia. 
The State argues that the home searched here was listed as the defendant's 
residence. They found a social security car bearing his name with a day planner. 
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Other items associated with males were located in this bedroom. They found drug 
paraphernalia. The home was not being used by the defendant here. In fact, others 
were present at the home at the time of the search. 
PARAPHERNALIA AND RESIDUE/ COMPARISON OF STATUTES 
It is contemplated within the drug paraphernalia statute that residue will be or 
may be upon said drug paraphernalia. The definition of drug paraphernalia (see 58-
37A-3) means: 
"any equipment, product, or material used, or intended for use, to 
plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture, 
compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, 
package, re-package, tear, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale, 
or to otherwise to introduce a controlled substance into the human 
body in violation of title 58, chapter 37, and includes, but is not 
limited to....(11) hypodermic syringes, needles, and other objects 
used, intended for use to parentally, inject controlled substances 
into the human body; and (12) objects used, or intended for use to 
ingest, inhale, or otherwise introduce marijuana, or cocaine 
through drugs...into the human body..." 
In determining whether an object is drug paraphernalia, the trier of fact, in 
addition to all other logical relevant factors, should consider: 
. . . (5) the existence of any residue of a controlled substance of an 
object. U.C.A. 58-37A-4. 
It is unlawful to use or possess such drug paraphernalia. U.C.A. 58-37A-5. It 
is contemplated within the paraphernalia statute, that substances or residue of 
substances would be located upon such paraphernalia and be the basis for the 
determination that it is paraphernalia. 
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Absent any residue located upon the items, it is not paraphernalia. It is the 
residue that makes it paraphernalia. Consequently, residue must exist therein in the 
present setting to justify the paraphernalia conviction. 
In conclusion, a conviction for possession of paraphernalia may include the 
possession of an object with residue upon it. But a second conviction for possession 
of the controlled substance is barred since it twice punishes the defendant based on 
one bad act. 
STATUTORY AUTHORITY 
SINGLE CRIMINAL EPISODE 
Statutory, Utah has enacted the 'Single Criminal Episode" statute which 
prohibits multiple punishments based on one act. U.C.A. 76-1-402 (1) provides that 
when the same act of a defendant under a single criminal episode shall establish 
offenses which may be punished in different ways under different provisions of the 
criminal code, the act shall be punishable under only one such provision. An 
acquittal or conviction and sentence under any such provision bars a prosecution 
under any other such provision. The accused may not be convicted of both the 
offense charged and the included offense. U.C.A. 76-1-402 (3). 
An offense is so included when it is established by proof of the same or less 
than all the facts required to establish the commission of the offense charged or it 
constitutes an attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, or a form of preparation. U.C.A 76-
1-402 (3). To prove that the items are paraphernalia, the prosecution must prove the 
presence of residue. 
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The defendant argues herein that the prosecution of the paraphernalia charge 
includes within its proof the presence of residue, which the State chooses to prosecute 
in addition to the paraphernalia charge. By proof of the presence of residue, the State 
proves possession of paraphernalia and the defendant may be only prosecuted on 
one. 
THE MORE PARTICULAR STATUTE APPLIES 
Furthermore, when an individual's conduct can be construed to be a violation 
two overlapping statutes, the more specific statute applies and governs. State v. Hill, 
688 P.2d 450 (Utah 1984). When two statutes interdicted the same conduct but 
imposed different penalties, it entitled the violator to the lesser punishment. State v. 
Hill. In Hill, the State chose to charge the defendant with theft by deception when 
he sold baking soda represented to be good cocaine. He was convicted and appealed. 
The Court held that the "Imitation Controlled Substance Act" applied and mandated 
a conviction under such provisions as opposed to the theft statute because the more 
specific statute applied and the defendant was entided to the lesser punishment. He 
could not be prosecuted for both. 
COUNT 3 & 4. 
In Count 3 and 4, the State presented no evidence of any controlled substance. 
The date of the charge is August 20, 2002. Count 1 and 2 were dated August 8, 2002. 
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Their evidence relies only on some amount of reportedly morphine (loratab) and 
methamphetamine found in his urine. No controlled substances were located. Only 
the residual product found in the blood suggesting prior use. 
The defendant advised that he had a prescription for Loratab (morphine). 
Yet, the State charges the defendant with possession of the drug. 
The State's evidence is lacking. The case law to support the dismissal of these 
charges is found in State v. Sorenson, 758 P.2d 466. 
In a State v. Sorensen. Utah Court of Appeals faced a similar situation. A 
young man was accused of consumption of alcohol by a minor. Although the case 
was resolved on other grounds, the Court gave directives on this issue. The Court 
found that one lower court in Washington County found that the presence of alcohol 
in the blood did not constitute possession. The Sorenson Court then cited the 
following decisions as being well reasoned. 
The Court cited State v. Lewis. 394 NW2d 212, 217 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) 
where that Court found that evidence of controlled substances in the person's urine 
does not establish possession within the meaning of Minnesota statute. Also cited 
was State v. Hornadav. 105 Wash. 2d 120, 713 P2d 71,76(1986) wherein the court 
considered the term possession of liquor should not be interpreted to include liquor 
which is in the body. 
In State v. Hornadav. 713 P.2d 71 (Wash. 1986), the Washington Supreme 
Court found that the terms of 'possess, acquire, or use have similar definitions as it 
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relates to drugs and alcohol. They all are defined to require that the defendant 1) 
knows of the substance's presence, 2) is immediately accessible, and 3) the defendant 
exercises dominion and control over the substance. 
The Court found that once a drug is injected into the body, it is no longer in 
the individual's control for the purpose of possession. The essential element of 
control is thereby absent. The Washington Court cites other Washington decisions. 
See State v. Reid. 66 Wash. 2d 243, 247, 401 P.2d 988 (1965) and also State v. 
Flinchpaugh, 232 Kan. 831, 834, 659 P.2ds 208 (1983); State v. Downes, 31 Or. App. 
1183, 572 P.2d 1328 (1977); Franklin v. State. 8 Md. App. 134, 258 A.2d 767 (1969) 
to advance this position. 
In State v. Lewis. 394 NW. 2d 212, 217 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986), the defendant 
was accused of possessing morphine. The facts supporting a conviction was that the 
defendant was in an automobile accident wherein the defendant submitted to a urine 
tests which noted the presence of morphine. The officer also testified as to the 
presence of needle marks on the defendant's arms. The Lewis Court citing State v. 
Flinchpaugh, 232 Kan. 831, 659 P.208 (1983) held that discovery of a drug in a 
person's blood is circumstantial evidence tending to prove prior possession of the 
drug, but it is not sufficient evidence to prove guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Utah decisions reflect this same definition of possession. See argument above. 
The presence of a controlled substance in the urine may be indicative of prior 
possession but not current possession of the controlled substance. First, it is not a 
controlled substance by definition but the residual effects of using the narcotic. 
Controlled substance means the drugs or substances as set out in the 
Schedules 1,11, III, IV, or V of the act.U.C.A. 58-37-2(4). It does not include the 
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residual metabolized substance found within the urine. If, if fact, the drug has been 
taken, it had been metabolized by the body and is useless as a narcotic. It simply 
does not meet the definitions of the 'Controlled Substance Act\ 
Secondly, the State has failed to give proof as to the location of the supposed 
use of the controlled substance. In State v. Sorenson, the Court found it necessary to 
prove County of use and found it unconstitutional to presume use in the County of 
arrest. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's dismissal should be upheld. The trial court has an obligation 
statutorily and constitutionally to ferret out unfounded accusations. The trial court is 
not to act as a rubber stamp approving the filings of each charge and information. 
The trial court is not required to rule on every evidentiary matter in the favor of the 
State. The trial court must use its own discretion in making judicial decisions 
respecting what is and what is not reliable hearsay. The use of an ex-wife's statement 
incriminating another and avoiding her own criminal sanctions should be consider to 
be untrustworthy on all occasions. The motivation to incriminate another and not 
herself is obvious especially when on considers hostilities that sometimes exists 
between ex-spouses. 
The mere presence of the defendant at a home where he once occupied should 
never be considered evidence sufficient to bind him over for trial. He has no ability 
to exercise dominion and control over any narcotic. The narcotics are not accessible 
or usable. 
The evidence in the urine that one has at sometime used a narcotic does not 
rise to the level of possession of the controlled substance. We do not know of the 
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location of the use or the time of the reported use. It is a not a usable narcotic but it is 
evidence of past use. 
DATED AND SIGNED this 14th day of April, 2003. 
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ORDER ON PRELIMINARY 
EXAMINATION 
Case No. 021600164 
Assigned Judge: David L. Mower 
A Preliminary Examination was conducted in this case on September 25, 2002. During 
the examination the following facts were shown. 
Findings of Fact 
1. The defendant was and is currently on probation and is being supervised by the 
Utah Department of Corrections, Adult Probation and Parole. 
2. There is a single family residence located in the Sanpete County, Utah. 
3. A Search Warrant was issued. 
4. On August 8,2002 several officers went to the residence to execute the search 
warrant. 
5. The warrant was executed and the residence was searched. 
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6. The defendant was not there. 
7. The following items were found in a bedroom 
a. A social security card in the name of the defendant. 
b. A calendar or day-planner bearing the name of the defendant. 
c. Men's clothing and other items generally found in a man's bedroom. 
8. Items of drug paraphernalia were found in the same bedroom. 
9. One of the searching officers had a conversation with a female person who was 
present and identified as the defendant's ex-wife. She said that the defendant was 
living in the residence and had spent the previous night there. 
10. The items of paraphernalia were tested and found to contain residue of 
methamphetamine, a controlled substance. 
Analysis 
The charge pending against the defendant is: ILLEGAL POSSESSION/USE OF 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE - 3RD Degree felony. 
There was no evidence to show that the defendant was engaged in the criminal enterprise 
of possession or use of a controlled substance. The defendant made no incriminating statements. 
He was not close to the drugs because he was not present. There was no evidence showing that he 
was participating with others in the mutual use and enjoyment of the drug paraphernalia. 
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Conclusion 
The evidence was not sufficient to justify a bind over. Consequently, the charge against 
the defendant is dismissed. 
Date &e* ^C] , 2002 
Davicf L.Mower 
District Court Judge 
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